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on households as well as the central governmental budget. Relating to the micro simulation 
literature this model can be labeled a static micro simulation model with behavioral changes. 
This behavioral change takes two different forms and use two different types of models; first 
binary models that describe mobility in/out from non-work states such as old age pension, 
disability, unemployment, long term sickness and second models that describe change in 
working hours and welfare participation. Thus, apart from the choice to work or not to work, 
working hours conditional on working as well as welfare participation are treated as 
endogenous variables. As an application the model is used to evaluate the recent Swedish 
“make work pay” reform, effective from 2007 and further reinforced in 2008 and 2009. The 
key characteristic of this reform is an in-work tax credit and decreased state tax rate. 
Simulations performed by SWEtaxben show increased working hours at both the intensive as 
well as extensive margin. The tax decrease together with dynamic changes results in a 
strong increase in household’s incomes but also a reduction in income inequality. However, 
even considering the increase in hours of work, the reform is far from being self-financed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  The purpose of SWEtaxben is to evaluate the impact of changes in the tax/benefit systems 
on households as well as the central governmental budget. For the household the main effects are 
changes in disposable income (income after tax and transfers), labor supply and welfare 
participation. Since the method is based on micro data, the effects are evaluated for each 
individual/household, and aggregated measures such as total revenues/expenditure can be 
obtained and hence the impact of a policy change on central governmental budget can be 
calculated. Furthermore, due to the micro approach, distributional effects can be produced, thus 
Gini- or similar measures on income can be presented for each evaluated reform. A part of the 
evaluation also include a measure of change in social welfare, a welfare function has been 
estimated and changes in welfare as well as in income and working hours is included in the 
reform evaluation. The sample used are based on 2006 year LINDA, the sample size correspond 
to almost 8% of the Swedish population, thus all the output is given with a high precision and 
since the sampling weights are known aggregate population measures can be produced. 
  Relating to the micro simulation literature SWEtaxben can be labeled a static micro 
simulation model with behavioral changes. Thus, different from a pure static model this model 
allows for a change in individual behavior as a response to a change in economic incentives. This 
behavioral change takes two different forms and use two different types of models; first binary 
models that describe mobility in/out from non-work states such as old age pension, disability, 
unemployment, long term sickness and second models that describe change in working hours 
and welfare participation. Thus, apart from the choice to work or not to work, working hours 
conditional on working as well as welfare participation are treated as endogenous variables. 
  Compared to most other static micro simulation models SWEtaxben stands out in at least 
three dimensions; the quality of the data, the detailed description of  tax/benefit rules and the 
sophistication of the included statistical models.
2 The model consists of two major parts, one is a 
tax/benefit program, which gives a detailed description of the tax and  benefit rules, and the other 
is the prediction program that calls the tax/benefit program (repeatedly) to calculate disposable 
income and replacement rates needed for prediction of variables such as occupational status, 
working hours, income, taxes etc. 
                                                 
2 Another advantage relates to the maintenance of the changes in tax/benefit rules. The fact that the tax/benefit rules in 
SWEtaxben is a subset of a tax/benefit model supported by Statistical Sweden, makes it is easy to include yearly updates.  4
  In order to present the model we start by describing the data needed for simulation, then 
the structure of the tax/benefit program followed by the structure of the full model. After that the 
estimated behavioral models will be presented and a special attention is given to the social 





  The data used for simulation comes from the Swedish register-based LINDA
3. LINDA 
consists of a large panel of individuals and their household members; the sample used in this 
study comes from the 2006 wave of LINDA. Since the whole LINDA survey of 785 341 
individuals is included no selections are used
4. In order to include all individuals the values for 
some individuals on some of the variables needed for the simulation have been imputed, most 
notably hourly wage rate, W, and yearly working hours, H.   
Hourly wage data was collected from the official statistics by Statistics Sweden, based on 
employers’ reports. Employers report monthly earnings, expressed in full-time equivalents, thus 
giving the amount the individual would have earned if employed on a full-time contract. To 
obtain hourly wage rates, the monthly earnings are divided by 165. Yearly hours of work, H, is 
then defined as total labor earnings divided by the hourly wage rate. The hourly wage rate used 
here is different from that obtained by dividing observed earnings by observed hours, which has 
a tendency to include measurement errors. The data used here is not subject to the same problem 
since these measures come from employer’s record and not from interviews; as a result no top- 
or bottom coding is needed. However, there are missing values from the employers reported 
earnings and as usual; a remaining problem is that wage rates are missing for non-working 
individuals. Wage equation, for males and females separately, are estimated and based on the 
estimates predicted values are used for those that miss information. 
Even if LINDA includes an unusual rich set of information some information is still 
missing, for instance there is no information about cost of housing, needed as an input in the 
calculation of housing allowance. Therefore, the cost of housing was imputed using information 
from an alternative data source, the Swedish Household Income Survey 2006, also supplied by 
Statistics Sweden. In the imputation we used the method of minimum-distance, using age, 
                                                 
3 For a description of LINDA see Edin and Fredriksson (2000). 
4 The only requirement is that the individual is included in the population register.  5
number of children, earnings, place of residence, and citizenship as classification variables. 
Another variable with no information is cost of child care. However, the childcare fees could still 
be calculated since the rules are known and since the take-up ratio is high we assume that 
everyone utilize municipal child-care.  
The SWEtaxben model includes several statistical models used for predictions. The 
variables used in these models are: age, education, age and number of children, Swedish born, 
years of working experience, marital status and region. Apart from these variables also 
disposable income, or replacement rates, is included; this is calculated in the tax/benefit program 
as will be explained below. 
  An important feature of the model is that it allows mobility between different 
occupational states. For this purpose the sample is divided into different categories based on age 
or occupation, here the following nine different groups are used: 
 
1. Child, 0-15 years of age 
2. Old age pensioner, from age 61- 
3. Student 
4. Disability pensioner, 18-64 and old age pensioner after 64 
5. Parental leave 
6. Unemployed, 18-64 and old age pensioner after 64 
7. Other (no income from states 2-6, 8, 9 but can have income from social assistance) 
8. Long term sick, 18-64 and old age pensioner after 64 
9. Working, 18-70 and old age pensioner after 70 
 
This classification relates to full time status during the base year (2006) and is primarily 
based on the main income source. If an individual gets the largest part from old age pension then 
he is classified as a pensioner, if it comes from disability pension then he is classified as disabled 
and so on. There are also some age related criteria that overrules the income source. Thus all 
individuals less than 16 are classified as a child and all individuals above 70 as an old age 
pensioner. An individual can only be classified as disabled, unemployed or long term sick up to 
64 year of age, above that he is classified as an old age pensioner.  
  In order to have some point of reference we have adopted the income limits so that the 
numbers of individuals in the different categories are reasonable similar to statistics based on the 
labor force survey (LFS). Table 1 compares our classification based on LINDA for year 2006  6
data with the corresponding LFS statistics. As follows from the table the correspondence is 
reasonably close. 
  Table 2 is based on a more detailed classification. Note that it is not possible to 
distinguish long term sick from working, so working includes both these two groups and also 
parental leave is not included in LFS. 
  Again, apart from the group classified as other, the correspondence between LFS and 
LINDA is reasonable close. However, it is important to remember that the simulation is based on 
predicted status and not observed, thus predicted before and after a reform is what matters. Since 
predicted status differ from the statistics in the tables above it is important not to pay too much 
attention to absolute numbers but rather focus on percentage changes. 
  Even if all individuals in LINDA are included in the simulations, not all are included in 
the stochastic models. Individuals classified as children, students or on parental leave as well as 
older children living with their parents are only included indirectly. All their available 
information of income is used in the calculation of household disposable income but this 
information is calculated in the initial start data and does not change in the simulation. Since 
SWEtaxben is a static model people do not age, thus a child is a child before and after a reform 
(it is also true that a pensioner is a pensioner above age 70). For students we have not tried to 
model the entry/exit probability. This would be complicated in a static model, but in a future 
development of the model it is in principle possible to allow also for students to change status 
due to a policy change. Individuals on parental leave have little incentives to leave this state and 
this is also a rather small group to be of an interest in a policy simulation (unless the policy 
simulation is related to a change in parental leave). Again a model that addresses the possibility 
that economic incentives affect the probability of parental leave can be included in a future 
version. Older children could in principle be allowed to change behavior; however that requires a 
model of household labor supply that allows for more than two decision makers per household. 
We are not aware of any such model, but alternatively they could be treated as singles, however 
neglecting that they are part of a household is not very realistic. This is also an area for a future 
version. However, again individuals not included in stochastic models are still included in 
calculation of household income and in the simulation but they keep their observed information 
from the start data set. 
 
   7
3. Mini_FASIT a tax/benefit program 
 
  The tax/benefit part of SWEtaxben which we refer to as MINI_FASIT is primarily a tool 
for calculation of household budget sets.
5 For the two earners household the budget (disposable 
income or net income after tax and transfers) evaluated at observed working hours is given as
6: 
 
(1) C=Im+If +Bs+Bh-Bc    where Ii = WiHi+Yi+Vi-t(Xi), i=m (male), f (female)               
 
  Apart, from hourly wages, Wi and yearly working hours, Hi, Yi represent non-earned 
taxable income (e.g. capital income, old age pension and benefits from unemployment, disability 
and long term sickness) and Vi non-earned non-taxable income (e.g. child allowance), t is a tax 
function defined on taxable income, Xi, (Xi= WiHi+Yi –Di, where Di is deductions for work 
related expenses or part of premium for private pension savings). The three means-tested (that is 
dependent on Hi) transfers considered are social assistance (Bs), housing allowance (Bh) and cost 
of child care (Bc), finally old-age pension (Bp) is also included.  
  As indicated by (1), disposable income of a household consists of both earned and 
unearned income. The income components included in V (such as the national child allowance) 
are not dependent on H and therefore calculated in the start data and kept constant during the 
simulation. The income components included in Y can be either dependent or independent on H.    
Capital gains for instance are independent of H whereas unemployment benefits and other 
transfers that are income dependent are calculated in MINI_FASIT. The simple principle (which 
however is not always followed) is that an income component that is not dependent on H is 
calculated in start data and kept constant in the simulation, whereas all other incomes are 
calculated in MINI_FASIT. The reason for this principle is that MINI_FASIT is called repeatedly 
for every individual and to speed up the evaluations only the minimum amount of   calculation 
have been included. As mentioned earlier calculations for part of the sample, such as older 
children living in parent’s household, are also done once in the start data and then kept constant.  
Given information of individual and household characteristics as well as income 
components that are independent of H, MINI_FASIT includes imputation of all relevant sources 
of income and taxes needed to calculate individual and household disposable income. First part 
                                                 
5 The reason it is called MINI is because it is a simplified version of FASIT, which is a tax/benefit program developed by 
Statistics Sweden and the Swedish Ministry of Finance. MINI_FASIT is a subset of FASIT concerning tax/benefit rules but an 
extension concerning rules that depends on hypothetical choices. For instance, pensions in FASIT are based on observed 
pensions from data, in MINI_FASIT pensions can be predicted at different retirement ages.    
6 The one-earner household is of course a trivial simplification.  8
calculates the individual component in (1), Ii = WiHi+Yi+Vi-t(Xi). The sequence in the individual 
part is as follows; 
  First, for individuals classified as disabled, income from disability pension is calculated.   
Next, we calculate income for those on long-term sicknesses and after that for those who are 
unemployed. In MINI_FASIT income from these sources are basically dependent on potential 
income from work given that the individual work full time (1 800 hours/year). For instance an 
individual that is unemployed has a replacement approximately 80 percent of potential income 
from work
7. Finally for old age pensioner income from pension is calculated. This step requires 
detailed information from the start data set as both pensions from the old as well as the new 
system are considered
8. For this purpose income records back to 1960 has been used to construct 
current pension rights. Apart from public pension, income from occupational pension is also 
calculated, however, due to the complexity in these systems a simplification has been used and 
all pensioners are compensated according to a system similar to the pension agreement for 
central governmental employee. Finally income from private pension is also included. This is 
possible since we have calculated accumulated savings and hence know current private pension 
wealth for each individual. The pension part of MINI_FASIT can be used to calculate the old age 
pension for any individual above age 61. 
After this taxes on income as well as capital gain and properties are calculated and hence 
at this stage the individual component of disposable income is known. Next step include 
calculation of the household specific components of three means-tested programs; social 
assistance, housing allowance, and cost of childcare.   
Social assistance is determined by nationwide rules and depends on household 
composition. To be entitled to social assistance, a household must have an income below the 
maximum benefit-level. Housing allowance is also determined by nationwide rules. The amount 
of housing allowance a household is entitled is determined by household total income, rent, the 
number of children and the age of the parents. The maximum-childcare fee-reform, which was 
implemented in 2002, is based on household income, but only up to a rather low ceiling above 
which the fee is constant. For the first child the fee is 3 percent, for the second child 2 percent, 
and for the third child 1 percent of gross household income. No fees are charged for further 
children. The ceiling is set fairly low, and as a result most households paid the monthly 
                                                 
7 According to the rules for the income year 2006 the replacement is 80 % first 200 days and 70% from 200-300 and 65% 
thereafter. 
 
8 Those born before 1938 are only included in the old system and those born after 1938 are on the old and new system and those 
born after 1952 are only on the new. The old system is based on income during the 15 best years and the new system on 
income during whole life.  9
maximum amount SEK 1,260, 840, and 420 for the first, second, and third child in child care.  
Given all information above, the individual part of disposable income as well as the 
household specific components, household disposable income can be calculated. The design of 
the model is such that a change in working hours produces a different measure of disposable 
income and by repeatedly calling MINI-FASIT with different hours the household’s budget set 
can be obtained. This budget set is the key variable in the prediction on households’ behavior of 
a policy change. In the models used for prediction of entry/exit from the non-work states 
(pension/disability/unemployment/sickness) the replacement rate is the economically crucial 
variable. This replacement rate is defined as disposable income in one of these four states, 
divided by income from full time work. For the model that predict working hours as well as 
welfare participation the economic variable is disposable income evaluated at seven different 
working classes, ranging from zero to long time. This will be described closer below when the 
sequential structure of a simulation is explained.  
   
4. The structure of SWEtaxben 
 
  The main sequential steps are given in Figure 1. As a first step the model is applied on the 
tax/benefit rules before the reform, the rules before can of course either be existing rules, for 
example those existed in 2006, or hypothetical rules. As described above these rules are 
implemented in MINI_FASIT. Next step involves changing MINI_FASIT to include new rules, 
for instance including the changes in the in-work tax credit and governmental tax rate that will 
be implemented in 2009
9. Note that if the simulation is a comparison over time, for instance 
2006 and 2009, than changes in prices and income has to be considered. This is considered by 
different price- and income base amounts but earnings have also been indexed and of course also 
other income sources can be indexed. After the simulation it is possible to deflate the results to 
prices before or after the reform. For instance the comparison can be made between predicted 
base scenario in 2006 and predicted outcome of a policy change in 2006 year prices. The steps 
described below will be the same both for the simulation before as after, the only difference is 
changes in MINI_FASIT.  
  First step (see Figure 1) involves the definition of replacement rate for disability pension. 
The population at risk is individuals age 18-64 (but not older children) with status 
disabled/unemployed, long term sick or working. For couples at least one of the spouses should 
                                                 
9 See the Central Governmental budget proposal 2008.  10
belong to the population at risk. For each individual in this population MINI_FASIT is called first 
to calculate disposable income assuming that everyone is classified as on full time disability. 
Next, for same individuals, income is calculated assuming full time work (H=1800). The ratio, 
disposable income from disability divided by disposable income from work, is the replacement 
rate. For instance a replacement rate of 0.7 means that an individual who receives full time 
compensation from disability insurance, receive 70 percent of the disposable income he would 
have as a full time worker. A change in a tax/benefit that has an effect on the replacement rate 
will also have an effect on the probability of entry to, staying in or exit from disability. Given the 
replacement rate, as well as all other variables included in the model, the probability of disability 
is calculated. In the calculation of this probability two stochastic terms enter, first a random draw 
from a normal distribution (with an estimated mean and variance) representing individual 
heterogeneity and second a Monte Carlo experiment. If the simulated probability is less than a 
random draw from a uniform (0-1) distribution, then the event takes place; that is, the individual 
is classified as disabled. Note that the random errors for each individual are the same before and 
after a reform. Individuals not classified as disabled gets the temporary status (10) and enter the 
next stochastic model in the sequence. 
  Next step involves unemployment and the population at risk is unemployed, long term 
sick, working and those belonging to the temporary status. The steps involved are the same as for 
disability, thus after this step the individuals in the risk population are either classified as 
unemployed or in the temporary state. 
  After this follows the long term sick, the population at risk is now long term sick, 
working and in the temporary state. Again same procedure and as a result of this module 
individuals are in the status long term sick or temporary. 
  The final binary model is old age pension; the population at risk is old age pensioner, 
other, working or temporary status at age 61-70. An individual below 61 is not eligible for an old 
age pension and all individuals above 70 are by default old age pensioners. Again after this step 
individuals are classified as old age pensioners or in the temporary state.  
  After these binary models a simple imputation follows, all individuals with the temporary 
status who before the reform belonged to one of the binary states, that is individuals who have 
exit from one of the binary states, are imputed as entering the working state and is given a 
working hour equal to 1 800. Note that we are not saying that an individual that for instance 
belong to disability (before the reform) and predicted to exit disability is given H=1 800. 
However, if this individual will pass the remaining three binary states and still be predicted as an 
exit, then he will get H=1 800. This concludes the first part of the model where the binary  11
models are used. Next we will explain imputation of working hours and participation in social 
assistance. 
  Every individual in the risk population (status other or working) are considered as 
working or voluntarily non-working. Thus this is typically the risk population in standard labor 
supply studies. For every individual in this population MINI-FASIT is called repeatedly in order 
to evaluate the budget set. For individuals classified as singles this requires 14 calls (7 working 
classes with and without social assistance) and for couples the creation of the budget set requires 
98 calls (7*7*2)
10. Note that for the couples at least one of the spouses should belong to the 
population at risk. Given the budget set and all other variables included in the labor supply 
models, working hours as well as the probability of social assistance is predicted. The stochastic 
experiment for those models involves draws from an extreme value distribution. Also note that 
different models have been estimated depending on family type. At this stage of the simulation 
every individual has a predicted status as well as working hours and welfare participation.  
  Finally, at predicted status and working hours, MINI_FASIT is called a last time to 
calculate predicted disposable income. Thus, this is the predicted disposable income for the 
individuals/households that are the results of the tax/benefit rules in MINI_FASIT. By changing 
the rules in MINI_FASIT and repeating the simulation we have the possibility of comparing 
disposable income before and after a reform. Of course the same is also true for any variable of 
interest that might have changed due to a reform, such as taxes, working hours, labor force 
participation, social assistance etc. The procedure for a policy evaluation is then to use the saved 
data sets (at least two) and run a program that creates a large amount of summary statistics that 
facilitates the policy evaluation. This output includes results from two evaluations; one without 
any behavioral responses (a traditional static analysis with no change in H), and one with 
potential behavioral responses where individuals are allowed to adjust hours of work and enter or 
leave different “out of work” statuses. An example of such an output is displayed at the end of 
this document. 
  At this stage a natural question is related to the sequence of binary models. Naturally an 
interesting and less restrictive approach would be based on a simultaneous model. However this 
would be much more complicated to implement and the main argument for the sequential 
structure is simplicity. However, the sequential approach also has the advantage of allowing 
models that differ in specification, thus it allows a higher flexibility in the specifications. The 
argument for the specific order in this sequence is based on observing the mobility using real 
                                                 
10 Of course in practice MINI_FASIT is evaluated 7 times for singe and 49 for spouses and each time disposable income with and 
without social assistance is calculated.  12
data over a few years. We are not arguing that it is a clear pattern that supports the order 
implemented here but there is some support for it. Also the population at risk involved in the 
different models is partly based on observing the data and partly on common sense. For instance 
few individuals move from other (no main source of income except social assistance) to 
disability, unemployment or long term sick. This is expected since there is in implicit work 
requirement in the compensation from those states. Thus an individual have to have a work 
history in order to get unemployment insurance and should not be allowed to move from other 
(7) to unemployed (6). However a huge complication is that we construct states that are intended 
to reflect whole year states, in reality an individual can be working a few months become 
unemployed during a period and perhaps after that long term sick and so on. This makes it much 
more difficult to exclude some patterns of mobility based on inspection of data. A future 
improvement of the model includes the possibility of part time states.  
  Of course the simulation results are dependent on the econometric models and for this 
reason a detailed presentation follows next.  
 
5. Binary models of occupational status 
 
  As mentioned above four econometric models are included in the simulation for the 
probability of disability, unemployment, long term sickness and old age pension. All of these 
models have been estimated as dynamic random-effects logit models. The data used for the 
estimation is a balanced LINDA panel from 2000-2006.  
  Following Wooldridge (2002, 2005) we define the model, 
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where yit denote the occupational status of individual i year t (1 if individual is disabled, 
unemployed and so on), yit-1 is the occupational status the previous year and the x-variables are 
measure of observed characteristics, like age, education and so on.  Unobserved determinants are 
either time-invariant, ci, or time-variant εit. The time-invariant unobserved component ci is  13
allowed to be correlated with the occupational status of the initial period and the time-average of 
the explanatory variables. The purpose is to address the initial conditions problem and the 
possible endogeneity of explanatory variables with respect to time-invariant characteristics. The 
   variables denote the average value for the time invariant variables for each individual.  
  The variables included in the different models are:    
Year effect:  
Year=2000, Yes=1, No=0, 
Year=2001, Yes=1, No=0, 
. 
. 
If year=2006, Yes=1, No=0, 
 
Age effect:  
If age 20-24, Yes=1, No=0,  
If age 25-29, Yes=1, No=0, 
. 
.  
if age 60-, Yes=1, No=0,  
 
Educational effect:  
If highest education is primary school, Yes=1, No=0,  
If highest education is secondary school, Yes=1, No=0,  
If highest education is a university degree, Yes=1, No=0, 
 
Regional effect: 
If Big city, Yes=1, No=0, 
If Medium city, Yes=1, No=0, 
If Countryside, Yes=1, No=0, 
 
Other variables: 
If born in Sweden, Yes=1, No=0,  
Gender, Male=1, Female=0,   
Single, Yes=1, No=0,  14
If income above ceiling for pension rights in the old age pension (7.5 income base amount), 
Yes=1, No=0,  
Replacement rate, disposable income given full time benefit divided by disposable income given 
full time market work (h=1800), 
Occupational status of individual i at t-1, Yes=1, No=0, 
Occupational status year 2000 (the initial value), Yes=1, No=0, 
 
  The results for disability pension are presented in Table 3. The importance of the initial 
condition as well as the status year t-1 signals that disability pension to a large extent is an 
absorbing state, that is of all individuals that enters this state  only a few are rehabilitated and 
able to exit. The year dummies show an increase over time and the age effect show that older 
have a much higher probability than younger. Other variables that imply a higher incidence of 
disability is low education, living in the countryside, being single, born outside Sweden and 
finally being a male. The replacement rate has a positive effect on the probability of disability. 
Thus reforms such as an in-work credit tax reform, which lower the replacement rate, reduce the 
probability of being disabled. However, due to the large lag and initial effect replacement rate 
plays only a minor role. The estimated ratio of the two error terms, individual over time specific 
(rho), shows that over 80% is due to the individual (time-invariant) error term, again, this shows 
the limited mobility over time.  
  The estimates for the unemployment model are given in Table 4. As expected the lag and 
initial condition are relatively less important in unemployment compared to disability.  The level 
of unemployment is increasing up to year 2004 and then decreasing. The age effect is u-shaped, 
high level for younger low for mid-age and again higher for older. The risk for unemployment is 
much higher for low educated and also for singles and those born outside Sweden. The 
replacement rate is positive and the point estimate is smaller compared to the corresponding rate 
for disability, but the smaller estimates for the initial condition and the lag value indicate that a 
change in replacement rate potentially has a larger effect on unemployment. This is also evident 
by the (much) smaller estimate of the error ratio. 
  Long term sickness (Table 5) is also characterized by smaller inertia, smaller lag and 
initial condition effect. There is no time trend but a strong age effect implying that older have a 
much higher likelihood of long term sickness. Individual characteristics have similar effects as 
for disability and unemployment, thus a low education, born outside Sweden and single all signal 
a higher probability of long term sickness. In contrast to unemployment, males have a higher 
probability. The replacement rate indicates a relatively high sensitiveness. Thus, the low error  15
ratio, only 25% due to individual heterogeneity, together with a rather weak lag and initial 
condition effects imply that exit/entry for long term sickness is affected by changes in tax/benefit 
rules. 
  Finally, the results for old age pension are presented in Table 6. The econometric 
specification for old age pension differs from the other binary models. Old age pension is almost 
completely an absorbed state, almost no individual in the sample, returns to work after retirement 
and further there is a very strong age impact. These characteristics made it necessary to drop the 
lag effect; however the initial condition is still included. The time effect is strong and increasing 
and not surprisingly the age dummies indicate a strong increase in the probability of old age 
pension after age 64. In common with the other binary models an increase in the probability is 
found for low education and born outside Sweden but males have also a higher incidence. 
Replacement ratio matters and since there is a ceiling in the public pension system an indicator is 
included that measures if the individual has an income above this threshold. The estimation 
shows that there is a higher probability of old age pension if income is above the cap. This result 
may be explained by the importance of other pillars in the pension system, such as occupational 
or private pension. 
  Next section presents the labor supply model estimated and simulated on the population 
at risk defined as status 7 and 9 (other and working).   
  
6. The labor supply model 
 
  We model labor supply as a discrete choice, following previous work by van Soest 
(1995); the household model is described in Flood et al. (2004) and the model for the single 
headed household in Flood et al. (2007). The discrete choice model allow us to include as many 
details as needed regarding the budget set and it extends naturally into a household model, where 
husbands and wives jointly determine their labor supply.  Specifically, we assume that each 
individual can choose among seven alternatives in the choice set of income-leisure combinations 
and hence the choice set for a household contains 7*7 different hours of work combinations.  
  We assume that family utility depends not only on consumption and leisure, but also on 
participation in social assistance. We further assume that the utility function is increasing in 
income and leisure and decreasing in welfare participation. The disutility from participation in a 
social assistance is assumed to reflect the non-monetary costs, such as fixed costs or “stigma”,  16
and is included to account for nonparticipation among eligible families.
11  
  Following van Soest (1995), we use a trans-log specification of the direct utility function, 
and for any specific household we have: 
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and for single headed household as:   
(4)
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where C is household disposable income described above and (T-Hj ) is leisure (j= M, (male) or 
F (female) and T is an upper limit (4000)  PSA is a binary variable, one if the household is a 
receiver of social assistance else zero. Dj is also a binary variable, one if working hours is above 
zero; this reflects the importance of “fixed cost” of working.  
  In order to implement the model, we also have to specify the nature of heterogeneity in 
household preferences and the stochastic disturbances. For the household model heterogeneity in 
preferences for leisure is introduced as, 
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and in the specification of welfare participation as,  
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The corresponding specifications for the single person is given by, 
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11 What may appear as “stigma” or disutility from welfare participation may also result from the inability of the econometrician 
to measure true welfare eligibility. Moreover, imperfect information regarding benefit eligibility on behalf of the household is 
also included in this non-monetary cost.   
  17
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  The z-vector includes measurable individual and household characteristics and the  ´s 
represents unobserved variables that affect preferences for leisure. As usual it is assumed that an 
important source for population heterogeneity in terms of preferences for leisure is unobserved. 
In order to account for this, we formulate a finite mixture model, which allows for unobserved 
heterogeneity in a very flexible way without imposing a parametric structure. To make the model 
estimable, additional random disturbances are added to the utilities of all choice opportunities 
(for details see Flood et al. (2004) and Flood et al. (2007)).  
  In the estimation seven different classes or intervals of working hours per year have been 
used; 0, 1-500, 501-1000, 1001-1500, 1501-2000, 2001-2500, and above 2500.  
   The estimated parameters are presented in Table 7-8 and goodness of fit as well as 
elasticities in Tables 9-11. Since the parameters in these highly non-linear models do not have a 
simple interpretation, Table 9 below presents wage elasticities. These are within the bounds 
typically presented in the literature, higher for females and a negative male-female cross 
elasticity.  
  Table 10 and 11 present the predicted hour distribution. In most cases the fit is good and 
especially the frequency of zero hours is picked up quite well. This is important since many 
reforms are designed to increase hours at the extensive margin and the effects of such reforms 
can be under- or overestimated if this ratio is not reasonable correct.  
  Even if the elasticities seem reasonable it is important to remember that this is only a 
measure that summarizes the sensitivity of all individuals in the sample. It is not easy to draw 
any conclusion about a likely response to a tax/benefit reform based on these estimates. This is 
the reason we turn to a policy simulation. However, before the results are presented a short 
description of the welfare function is presented. 
 
7. The social welfare function
12 
 
So far we have not discussed a suitable measure that can be used to characterize the 
welfare benefits of a reform. Even if it is relevant to measure the change in level or distribution 
of disposable income this is not an ideal measure for evaluating whether a reform should be 
preferred or not. For instance, a reform such as the in-work tax credit and decreased state tax that 
                                                 
12 This section is largely based on Aaberge and Flood (2008) and Aaberge and Colombino (2008) and for further details we refer 
to these two sources.  18
is evaluated below is found to both increase the level of income as well as reduce the inequality 
of the income distribution. Even if this can be judged as an improvement it does not necessarily 
imply increased welfare for every individual. The reason is that some households have increased 
their income due to increased working hours whereas others have obtained higher income 
without increased hours. Since we assume that working hours is a disutility, that is leisure is a 
normal good, the increase in income and decrease in leisure might very well result in a decreased 
welfare.  For this reason a social welfare function is estimated and will be used as one part of the 
evaluation of a reform.  
  We introduce the idea of a social planner who wants to implement a tax/benefit design to 
optimize welfare. The well known problem of interpersonal comparability is solved by assuming 
the existence of a common individual welfare function which is assumed to increase in income 
and leisure. The formal definition of the individual welfare function (Ψ) determined by the social 
planner is given by  
(10)  Ψ i=f(Li,Ci)        
where L is leisure and C is disposable income. In this application a quadratic utility function has 
been used and the estimation is described below.  
  The simplest measure of aggregate welfare is simply to sum all individuals’ measure of 
welfare. However, since this implies equal welfare weights to the individuals, independent of the 
welfare level, this specific welfare function ignores distributive considerations. In order to 
address distributive justice individuals with a low welfare should be assigned larger welfare 
weights than those that are better off. This is described by the following family of rank-
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The implication of (11) is that the weights given to low-welfare, individuals decrease 
with increasing k. As  , k kW →∞  approaches inequality neutrality and coincides with the linear 
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  To provide a simple guide to understand the inequality aversion profiles exhibited by W1, 
W2, W3 and W∞ Table 12 provides ratios of the corresponding weights – as defined by (11) – of 
the median individual and the one percent poorest, the five percent poorest, the thirty percent 
poorest and the five percent richest individual for different social welfare criteria.  
 
7.1 Estimation of the Social welfare function 
 
The welfare function can be estimated either on household or on individuals. In either case the 
problem of comparing single- and non-single household must be solved. In Aaberge et. al. 
(2008)  the welfare measure is based on individuals and in order to make individuals in couple 
and single household comparable the disposable income of the couple is divided by the square 
root of two. In this study we choose the household as the unit for estimation and welfare 
evaluation. We do this by transforming a couple-household into one representative household by 
using the average of disposable income (C) and working hours (H). Further, in order to 
compensate for number of children we divide household disposable income by the square root of 
number of children. A discrete choice translog model,  
(14)   () ( )
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is estimated on a sample of households younger than 70 (mean age for couples). Thus, this is a 
simplified version of model (4) described above and as in (4) T=4 and hours H are divided by 1 
000 and income C by 100 000. The estimated parameters are presented in Table 13. These 
parameters produce a welfare function increasing in leisure and income. The indifference curves 
presented in Figure 2 shows that the welfare function is more sensitive for a change in income 
rather than leisure.  
  An application of these welfare measures is provided in the next section when an 
evaluation of a Swedish tax reform is discussed. 
 
8. Evaluation of the proposed 2009 tax reform 
 
  The Swedish income tax system consists of a flat municipal tax and a progressive 
national tax regime for earnings as well as for non-labor income. The individual is the taxation-
unit and income taxes are independent of marital status. The flat municipal tax rate varies across  20
municipalities; the average municipal tax-rate in 2007 was 31.55 percent, the lowest 28.89 and 
the highest 34.24.  
  The evaluated tax reform consists of two parts; an in-work tax credit and a reduced 
national tax level. The in-work tax credit, includes the level introduced in 2007, 2008 as well as 
the proposed change 2009. Thus, what is referred to as the reform “after” corresponds to the 
level of in-work tax credit and state tax level suggested in the budget proposition for year 2009, 
the “before” reform is obtained by removing the in-work tax credit completely and also 
increasing the state tax to its 2008 year level. 
  Figure 3 displays the marginal and average tax rates for the income year 2009, before and 
after the reform. The marginal taxes before the reform have an irregular shape up to about SEK 
350,000, the break point for governmental tax, and the reform imply a reduced tax rate by 
increasing this level. The irregular shape, before the reform, to the left of the break point is 
explained by the phase-in and phase-out of a basic tax deduction. This basic tax deduction 
remains unchanged after the reform but the tax credit is designed such that it smooth’s the 
irregularities created by the basic deduction. The result is an increasing step-wise marginal tax 
rate with the following tax rates and kink points (for an average municipal tax rate).  Zero tax 
rate up to a taxable income of SEK 40,000, next about 24% up to SEK 116,000, about 29% up to 
SEK 300,000, almost 32% up to SEK 364,000, 52% up to SEK 507,100 and finally 57%. It 
should also be mentioned that the in-work tax credit used in Figure 3 applies for age younger 
than 65 and for an average municipal tax rate. For individual above 65 years of age and still 
working the tax credit is much more generous. This is considered in the simulation but, again, 
not in Figure 3. 
The distribution of taxable income (in 2009 prices) shows that most individuals after the 
reform face a marginal tax rate lower or close to the municipal tax rate. About 17 percent has a 
higher income than the first (after reform) breakpoint for governmental tax and very few pay the 
highest rate. Most individuals face lower marginal tax rates due to the reform, the only 
exceptions are those above the breakpoint (after the reform). Hence, the average tax rate declines 
for everyone with a positive labor income, but much more for low than for high incomes. 
However, since the tax credit only applies for income from work, the tax reform increases the 
incentives for transitions to job participation for those who did not work before the reform. The 
incentive effects for those who were working before the reform are mixed. Below the after 
reform breakpoint the marginal tax rates have been reduced but for high income earners located 
above the breakpoint, marginal tax rates are unchanged but the average taxes have declined. 
Thus, a negative income effect might result in reduced working hours for high income earners.  21
Finally, note that the reform results in a substantial tax cut, especially for low income earners. 
For an income of SEK 150,000 the average tax rate is less than 20 percent and at 300,000 less 
than 25 percent.  
To avoid choosing low hours of work most in-work tax credits programs has a phase in 
region and to avoid an income support to wealthy households there is also typically a phase out 
region. However, the Swedish design, implemented in 2007 and further extended in 2008 and 
2009, differs from the mainstream design; it has no phase out region and the credit applies for all 
individuals with income from work. Moreover, unlike the US and UK reform the credit is not 
refundable.  
Apart from the in-work tax credit there is also a basic tax deduction, see Figure 4. The 
basic deduction, which all individuals can claim, reduces taxable income (the income base for 
municipal and governmental tax). The basic deduction have three levels depending on the level 
of taxable income; SEK 18,000, 33,000 and 12,500. The in-work tax credit, which is deducted 
from the tax rate, increases with taxable income and reach a maximum value at SEK 18,000. 
The tax credit reform applies for all individuals with an income from work. In the 
governmental budget proposal for 2008 the tax relief of this reform is estimated to about SEK 50 
billion and the increased tax credit together with the reduced state tax rate suggested  in the 
budget proposal for 2009 is estimated to an additional SEK 15 billion, assuming no behavioral 
effects from the reform. Also note that the in-work tax credit for individuals older than 65 is 




  Table 14 presents the aggregated results for the central governmental budget. The strong 
reduction in taxes results in an increase in disposable income (almost 6 percent). Earnings have 
increased much less which of course implies a reduction in tax revenues (SEK 70 billion or close 
to 12 percent). This is almost completely due to the in-work tax credit. Even if revenues from 
taxes have reduced the increase in household’s income also implies a reduction in governmental 
expenditures for transfer payments.  The strongest effect is the reduction in sickness benefit 
whereas there is a much smaller decrease in unemployment- as well as disability benefits. As 
expected, due to the increase in disposable income, there is a sharp reduction in means tested 
benefits like housing allowance and social assistance. Apart from these effects we also consider 
change in VAT and payroll taxes. Assuming an average VAT of 17.6 percent on the increase in  22
disposable income adds more than SEK 14 billion to the governmental revenue. Finally a payroll 
tax of 32.42 percent on the increase of earnings adds another SEK 5.4 billion. If all entries are 
summed together the net result is a deficit of SEK 47 billion.  
  Of course the change in working hours are the driving force behind the dynamic effects 
reported in Table 14. These changes are summarized in Table 15 and it follows that working 
hours has increased 1.5% and number of working individuals by 1.1%.  
  Next, the change in the distribution of working hours is presented. As explained above 
the labor supply models are based on a classification of working hours in to seven discrete 
classes and Table 16 displays the before-after mobility between these classes. All entries on the 
main diagonal show the share of individuals within each class with same hours before and after. 
As expected the typical outcome is no change, but as indicated by all positive entries at the right 
hand side of the main diagonal, for those that change it is predominantly from lower to higher 
hours. The expected results from the in-work tax credit reform is an increase in work-
participation, however, Table 16 might not give the impression that the most important change is 
from zero to positive hours, but even if the percentage change is not that big the number of 
individual is. For those that change their hours it is typically to longer hours, 1 500 or more. The 
decrease in state tax makes it more economically rewarding to work longer hours. Apart from 
working hours an important set of information relates to the mobility between the work/non-
work states before and after the reform. The mobility tables are presented in Table 17. As 
follows by the entries on the main diagonal for several of the groups the change is small (not 
counting children, students and parental leave who should be unchanged), for instance only 0.6 
percent of those individuals classified as old age pensioner before the reform have left this state 
and most of those have moved to the working state after the reform and a similar result is also 
found for disability. These results follows from the estimated binary models presented above, 
both old age and disability pension is too much of an absorbing state. Even a generous in-work 
tax credit for older people that is part of the reform has a strong influence.  
  Unemployed show a stronger response and 1.5 percent have moved to the work state. 
Long term sickness a much stronger change in fact 6.7 percent have left sickness and almost all 
have started to work. As expected the strongest effect is reported for the group classified as other 
and 9 percent have changed to work.  
  The change from non work to work is explained by the change in replacement rate 
primarily caused by the in-work tax credit. Table 18 show average replacement rates before and 
after the reform as well as the percentage change. For instance the average rate for unemployed 
before the reform was 69.7 percent, i.e. as an unemployed you have 69.7 percent of disposable  23
income compared to if you worked full time. Due to the in-work tax credit this rate decrease to 
64.8 percent, thus a decrease of seven percent. 
  Next we turn to the change in distribution of disposable income caused by the reform. 
Figure 5 is constructed by classifying individuals into deciles based on the income before the 
reform. Then for each decile the change in income is calculated. The distribution shows that 
individuals with a medium or higher income have gained most. However, this graph includes all 
individuals, children as well as retired and as an alternative Table 19 presents the change in 
disposable income for different family types as well as the overall Gini-coefficient. Single 
mother increase their disposable income from SEK 141,000 to 149,000, a change of SEK 8,000 
or 6%. Single men and couples gain more in levels but about the same percentage change. The 
Gini-measure indicates a somewhat smaller income inequality.  
  The information discussed above can be misleading since it was based on all individuals, 
regardless of whether they are allowed to change working hours or not. In order to focus on the 
part of population that are most likely to be affected by the reform the information above is 
repeated but now excluding individuals who are children (older as well as younger), students,  on 
parental leave, and older than 70. As expected as follows form Figure 6 low income earners are 
now better off. The increase in the lowest decile is of course due to the increase in labor force 
participation.  
  The results in Table 20 are similar in percentage changes but since children and older are 
not included, the level is higher. The Gini-measure indicates a stronger decrease in inequality. 
The main explanation is the decrease in non-workers, by decreasing the ratio of non-workers had 
a positive effect on the income distribution. 
  Finally we turn to the effects on social welfare, Table 21. Using the social welfare 
function discussed above and applying the four different weights for inequality aversion, we find 
that social welfare have increased due to the reform. However, the profile show that the increase 
is larger if a larger weight is given for those with a low welfare (W1>W2>W3>W4). Thus, even if 
individuals with a low level of welfare before the reform often had a low income due to not 
working, to start working implies higher welfare. This demonstrates that the disutility from 
working is dominated by the increased welfare from consumption. The evaluation of the social 
welfare effect adds an important dimension the tax reform evaluation. The challenge is to design 
a reform not only to maximize after tax income, but rather to produce the highest social welfare. 
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10. Conclusion and future directions 
 
To include behavioral changes in a static micro simulation model has many advantages 
but also several challenges. From our perspective the most important reason for including 
behavioral changes is the demand for a framework to evaluate the impact of in-work tax credits. 
Owens (2005) discusses the importance of the “make work pay” policies and presents the design 
in several OECD countries. These policies always have a work requirement and the target group 
is disadvantaged groups with a low or zero employment rates. 
  SWEtaxben is a model that allows an evaluation of “make work pay” reforms on working 
hours, income and welfare of individuals “inside” or “outside” the labor market. The Swedish 
version of “make work pay” offers an informative illustration to the challenges that has to be 
addressed in order to provide a realistic evaluation. The in-work tax credit highlights the 
importance to analyze changes at the extensive margin. This implies a need to distinguish 
between different groups of “outsiders”. Individuals that are early retired or have disability 
pension have different compensation schemes than those who are unemployed or long term sick. 
The compensation schemes across the different groups have to be included in the benefit 
calculations and since the calculation of replacement rates also requires detailed information of 
other benefits such as social assistance and housing allowance also have to be included.  
  The Swedish reform has a much higher in-work tax credit for older and this raises the 
extremely important question of the retirement decision or alternatively the decision to move 
from retirement back to work decision. This requires inclusion of the pension system in the 
tax/benefit calculations and also a statistical model for the retirement decision.  
  Since welfare, or social assistance, is closely related to the working decision the rules for 
social assistance and also other welfare programs have to be included but also the take up 
problem have to be considered. Interestingly the take up problem cannot be avoided even in a 
purely static model. If we do not correct for the fact that a (large) portion of households that are 
entitled to social assistance do not apply for it, we will overestimate the cost of social assistance.  
In SWEtaxben the take up problem is part of the labor supply model. 
  Another characteristic of the Swedish reform is that lower replacement rates are not only 
obtained by in-work tax credit but also by lower unemployment benefits. Again, this is an 
argument for distinguishing the different groups of “outsiders”. 
  To assess the impact of an in-work tax reform it is necessary to distinguish the 
heterogeneity in the “outsiders” as well as the “insiders”. The high degree of non-linearity  25
created by a careful treatment of these differences is a strong argument for the micro-simulation 
approach. To add the reasonable assumption that the “make work pay” reform affect behavior is 
a further argument for a simulation model that allows individuals to adapt to economic 
incentives. 
  Even if the present version of SWEtaxben allows for an evaluation of a “make work pay” 
reform (and obviously to almost any alternative tax/benefit design) there is still room for many 
improvements in future versions. To include those individuals that are not affected by a policy 
change, such as students and older children, is one reasonable simple extension. To allow for 
part time occupations, for instance part time retirement and part time work, is a much more 
complicated issue. However, in terms of policy relevance this change has a high priority. 
  Another more ambitious change is to reduce the restriction implicit in the sequential 
structure in SWEtaxben. To allow for the simultaneous decision of working hours as well as 
occupational status would be much less restrictive, but also much more complicated. An 
interesting possibility is to extend the approach suggested in Aaberge and Flood (2008).
13 This 
paper analyzes the effect on in-work tax credit on lone mothers including individuals on 
disability, unemployment, long term sickness but not old age pension. In principle this approach 
can be extended to old age pension, a household model and part time occupations. The method 
allows for a large number of combinations of working hours, part time occupations and welfare 
participations and also allows for restrictions in the choice set. 
  Apart from the suggested extensions there is also a need to have a better assessment of 
the long run effects of a policy change. To correctly measure the effects of an increase in labor 
force participation it is clearly not enough to just measure the immediate (one-year effects). The 
effects on the individual’s life cycle should be incorporated. Even if this is an argument for a 
dynamic microsimulation model we like to make the contrast between the need to evaluate a 
specific reform, with all the details, and the need to evaluate general changes. To develop a 
dynamic model that allows for a detailed evaluation of complicated tax/benefit rules is quite a 
challenge. The approach suggested here is instead based on a static model, but allowing for a 
dynamic interpretation. For instance applying the direct effect on earnings profiles can give a 
crude measure of the effects of a tax change on life time income as well as on life time taxes.   
  An advantage with SWEtaxben is that it uses the same data as a dynamic simulation 
model (SESIM) developed at the Swedish Ministry of Finance.
14 An exciting future development 
is to integrate SWEtaxben and SESIM. The same individuals included in SWEtaxben can be 
                                                 
13 For recent applications, see Aaberge et al. (1995) and  Aaberge et al. 1999. 
14 See Flood (2008)  26
simulated over time in SESIM. The effects of a policy change on life time income, taxes, 
benefits can be recorded.  This would produce a much better understanding of the long run 
effects of a reform but still allowing for the detailed level required in order to keep it at a realistic 
level. 
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Table 1. Population age 16-64 in and outside the labor force. LFS and LINDA 2006 (in 
thousands). 
 




  Working Unemployed    
LINDA  4 241  229  1 384  5 854 
LFS  4 340  245 1 239 5 825
Source:  LFS  http://www.scb.se/statistik/AM/AM0401/2007M01/AKU2006.pdf 
 LINDA  own  calculations 
 
 
Table 2. Population age 16-64 according to occupational status. LFS and Linda 2006 (in 
thousands). 
 
  Children  Pensioner  Student Disability Parental 
leave 





LINDA  0  74  535  333  76  229  365  4 241  5 854 
LFS  0 80  525  395   245  238  4 340  5 825 
Source:  LFS Table 16 http://www.scb.se/statistik/AM/AM0401/2007M01/AKU2006.pdf 
               LINDA own calculations 
Note:      Other includes home worker, job seekers, military service and other, see Table 16. 
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Table 3. Random-effects logistic regression of disability pension. 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  error 
Initial condition   13.290*** 0.201 
Occupational status t-1  4.743*** 0.063 
Intercept  -10.407*** 0.247 
Year = 2002  0.605*** 0.054 
Year = 2003  1.014*** 0.056 
Year = 2004  1.334*** 0.058 
Year = 2005  1.658*** 0.060 
Year = 2006  1.620*** 0.063 
Age 20 – 24    -3.012*** 0.484 
Age 25 – 29  -2.881*** 0.191 
Age 30 – 34  -2.435*** 0.118 
Age 35 – 39  -1.998*** 0.090 
Age 40 – 44  -1.674*** 0.080 
Age 45 – 49  -1.409*** 0.077 
Age 50 – 54  -0.922*** 0.072 
Age 55 – 59  -0.329*** 0.062 
    
Primary school  2.664*** 0.087 
Secondary school  1.360*** 0.075 
Big city  -0.495*** 0.062 
Medium city  -0.106* 0.055 
Single  0.925*** 0.051 
Born in Sweden  -2.041*** 0.066 
Gender  1.310*** 0.051 
Replacement rate  0.877*** 0.289 
    
2 ˆc σ   3.879***  0.043 
2 ˆε σ   0.821***  0.003 
    
Log Likelihood value  -41,031.73
    
Number of observations  895,938
    
   Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
       
         








   31
Table 4. Random-effects logistic regression of unemployment. 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  error 
Initial condition   2.435*** 0.053 
Occupational status t-1  2.587*** 0.033 
Intercept  -5.810*** 0.104 
Year = 2002  0.170*** 0.034 
Year = 2003  0.328*** 0.034 
Year = 2004  0.572*** 0.033 
Year = 2005  0.420*** 0.034 
Year = 2006  0.382*** 0.034 
Age 20 – 24    0.222 0.143 
Age 25 – 29  0.097 0.066 
Age 30 – 34  -0.089* 0.051 
Age 35 – 39  -0.350*** 0.047 
Age 40 – 44  -0.490*** 0.045 
Age 45 – 49  -0.620*** 0.046 
Age 50 – 54  -0.642*** 0.047 
Age 55 – 59  -0.516*** 0.044 
    
Primary school  0.760*** 0.043 
Secondary school  0.455*** 0.035 
Big city  -0.042 0.031 
Medium city  0.028 0.028 
Single  0.250*** 0.026 
Born in Sweden  -0.635*** 0.035 
Gender  -0.091*** 0.025 
Replacement rate  0.534*** 0.109 
    
2 ˆc σ   1.638***  0.025 
2 ˆε σ   0.449***  0.008 
    
Log Likelihood value  -63,954.20
    
Number of observations  822,288
   






Table 5. Random-effects logistic regression of long term sickness 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  error 
Initial condition   1.116*** 0.049 
Occupational status t-1  3.197*** 0.034 
Intercept  -5.782*** 0.147 
Year = 2002  0.100*** 0.028 
Year = 2003  -0.002 0.029 
Year = 2004  -0.023 0.029 
Year = 2005  0.029 0.029 
Year = 2006  0.013 0.029 
Age 20 – 24    -1.150*** 0.205 
Age 25 – 29  -0.778*** 0.071 
Age 30 – 34  -0.577*** 0.046 
Age 35 – 39  -0.473*** 0.039 
Age 40 – 44  -0.463*** 0.037 
Age 45 – 49  -0.430*** 0.037 
Age 50 – 54  -0.328*** 0.036 
Age 55 – 59  -0.190*** 0.035 
    
Primary school  0.485*** 0.030 
Secondary school  0.239*** 0.024 
Big city  -0.051** 0.024 
Medium city  0.040* 0.022 
Single  0.160*** 0.021 
Born in Sweden  -0.390*** 0.028 
Gender  0.448*** 0.019 
Replacement rate  1.770*** 0.205 
    
2 ˆc σ   1.055***  0.025 
2 ˆε σ   0.253***  0.009 
    
Log Likelihood value  -77,431.30
    
Number of observations  750,846
   
   Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 




Table 6. Random-effects logistic regression of old age pension. 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  error 
Initial condition   9.264*** 0.128 
Income above ceiling   0.365*** 0.053 
Intercept  -4.483*** 0.164 
Year = 2002  1.667*** 0.057 
Year = 2003  2.702*** 0.065 
Year = 2004  3.375*** 0.073 
Year = 2005  3.886*** 0.082 
Year = 2006  4.652*** 0.094 
Age = 61    -1.330*** 0.114 
Age = 62  -1.572*** 0.094 
Age = 63  -1.727*** 0.081 
Age = 64  -1.554*** 0.069 
Age = 65  -0.844*** 0.060 
Age = 66  0.585*** 0.052 
    
Primary school  0.824*** 0.092 
Secondary school  0.505*** 0.081 
Big city  -0.204** 0.085 
Medium city  0.134* 0.080 
Born in Sweden  -0.376*** 0.103 
Gender  0.876*** 0.071 
Replacement rate  1.656*** 0.109 
    
2 ˆc σ   2.736***  0.041 
2 ˆε σ   0.695***  0.006 
    
Log Likelihood value  -22,198.51
    
Number of observations  77,490
   
   Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Labor supply estimates of the Household model 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  error 
Husband’s leisure:    
Intercept  34.277*** 1.002 
Big City  0.369*** 0.069 
Primary school  -0.794*** 0.114 
Secondary school  -1.235*** 0.077 
Age  -0.296*** 0.034 
2 100 Age   0.332***  0.037 
    
Wife’s leisure:    
Intercept  36.664*** 1.194 
Big City  -0.277*** 0.059 
Primary school  0.851*** 0.102 
Secondary school  0.185*** 0.052 
Age  -0.348*** 0.028 
2 100 Age   0.362***  0.031 
    
Utility parameters:    
1 α   8.893***  0.291 
11 α   2.257***  0.058 
22 α   -12.594***  0.142 
33 α   -12.503***  0.154 
12 α   -0.420***  0.057 
13 α   -0.630***  0.061 
23 α   0.857***  0.079 
    
Fixed costs:    
fch b   10.542***  0.125 
fcw b   6.617***  0.082 
    
Welfare:    
Intercept  13.826*** 0.677 
Big City  -0.094 0.150 
Swedish born, Husband  2.890*** 0.302 
Swedish born, Wife  3.363*** 0.356 
Primary school, Husband  -1.134*** 0.213 
Primary school, Husband  -1.702*** 0.225 
Age 18-29, Husband  6.005*** 0.404 
Age 30-34, Husband  2.536*** 0.506 
Age 18-29, Wife  -1.857*** 0.419 
Age 30-34, Wife  -0.647*** 0.290  35
   
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Continued… 
Table 7 Continued: 
    
Unobserved heterogeneity:    
Husband’s leisure:    
1 H φ   7.198***  0.004 
2 H φ   -10.940***  0.603 
3 H φ   3.742***  0.795 
    
Wife’s leisure:    
1 W φ   14.578*** 0.004 
2 W φ   -7.448***  0.963 
3 W φ   -7.130***  0.954 
    
Welfare:    
1 SA φ   21.970***  0.004 
2 SA φ   -9.399***  0.779 
3 SA φ   -12.571***  0.736 
    
Type probabilities:    
1 π   0.014*** 
(0.001) 
2 π   0.966*** 
(0.001) 
    
Log-likelihood value:  -58,565.97 
  
Number of observations  27,679
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Utility parameters:     
























     
Fixed costs:     






Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
Continued… 
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Table 8 Continued: 
     
Welfare:     




































     
Unobserved 
heterogeneity: 
   
Leisure:     


















     
Welfare:     


















     
Type probabilities:     












     
Log-likelihood  value:  -14,212.00 -9,284.92 -16,359.95 
    
Number of 
observations 
11,130  7,158  12,826 
      38
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Uncompensated wage elasticities, by family type 
 





Wage increase by 1%:  Male  Female  Female  Female  Male 
Male 0.10  -0.07     0.05 
Female 0  0.16  0.21  0.38   
 
 
Table 10. Observed and predicted working hours and social assistance for households. 
 
  Males  Females 








0  4.41 4.55 4.69 4.46 
1-500  0.03 0.00 0.18 0.10 
501-1000  0.45 0.10 1.76 1.51 
1001-1500 1.03  2.70  12.64  14.15 
1501-2000  31.52 29.65 53.81 51.23 
2001-2500  59.69 60.44 26.49 28.35 
2500-  2.86 2.55 0.44 0.20 




Social assistance  1.1  0.7 
 
 
Table 11. Observed and predicted working hours and social assistance for singles. 
 
  Single mothers  Single females  Single males 












0  9.85 9.42 7.59 7.63  13.96  13.85 
1-500  0.31 0.01 0.73 0.12 0.23 0.00 
501-1000  1.16 0.84 2.17 1.34 0.82 0.25 
1001-1500  8.52 9.84 5.44 9.68 1.49 3.43 
1501-2000  48.41 46.86 42.51 39.78 27.65 26.59 
2001-2500  30.96 32.30 40.64 40.19 53.06 53.00 
2500-  0.80 0.74 0.92 1.28 2.80 2.87 
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Table 12. Distributional weight profiles of four different social welfare functions 




W3  W∞  
(Utilitarian) 
p(.01)/p(.5)  6.64 1.98 1,33  1 
p(.05)/p(.5)  4.32 1.90 1.33  1 
p(.30)/p(.5)  1.74 1.40 1.21  1 
p(.95)/p(.5)  0.07 0.10 0.13  1 
 
 
Table 13. Estimated parameters of the Social Welfare Function 
 Estimates  Standard 
errors 
Log leisure, βl    3.0985 0.0215
Log leisure squared, βll    0.3620 0.0151
Log income, βC 4.7262 0.0224
Log income squared, βCC -0.0616 0.0089
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Table 14. Reform effect on central governmental budget (billions of SEK) 
       
Before After  Change  % 
Household income/tax      
Disposable income  1,398.4  1,480.1  81.7  5.8% 
Earnings 1,390.6  1,407.3  16.7  1.2% 
Old age pension  101.5  99.8  -1.7  -1.6% 
Total tax  604.9  534.9  -70.0  -11.6% 
        
        
        
Transfers        
Unemployment benefit  22.9  22.5  -0.4  -1.5% 
Sickness benefit  22.1  20.7  -1.4  -6.4% 
Disability pension  47.1  46.8  -0.3  -0.7% 
Child allowance  23.2  23.2  0.0  0.0% 
Housing allowance  2.9  2.7  -0.2  -7.4% 
Social assistance  15.8  14.9  -0.9  -5.7% 
Child care fees  10.4  10.5  0.1  0.8% 
        
VAT     14.4   
Payroll taxes     5.4  
        
Total budget effect      -47.0   
 
 
Table 15. Change in working hours and participation. 




Change  % 
        
Sum of worked hours  (billion)  8.0  8.1  0.1  1.5 
Number of workers (thousand) 4,131.7  4,178.8  47.0  1.1 
 
 
Table 16. Percentage change in working hours before/after reform, individuals age 18-65. 
Before\After  0  1-500  501-1000  1001-1500  1501-2000  2001-2500  2501- 
0 97.56  0.01  0.05  0.29  1.21  0.86  0.02 
1-500 0.00  84.95  0.00  0.00  13.49  1.56  0.00 
501-1000 0.06 0.00  86.73  0.98  5.85  6.24  0.14 
1001-1500 0.00  0.00  0.02  94.26  2.68  2.97  0.06 
1501-2000 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  99.15  0.78  0.02 
2001-2500 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.66  99.24  0.03 
2501- 0.00  0.00 0.01  0.03  1.04  1.58  97.35 
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Table 17. Change of occupational status before and after the reform (%) 
After 
Before  Child Pension Student Disability
Parental
leave UnemployedOtherSickness Work Total
Child 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  18.4
Pension 0.0  99.4 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  17.0
Parental leave  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  5.9 
Disability 0.0 0.0  0.0  99.2  0.0 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.6  3.1 
Parental leave  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 100.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.8 
Unemployed 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  98.3 0.2  0.0  1.5  1.5 
Other 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  91.0 0.0  9.0  3.5 
Sickness 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.3  93.3  6.5  1.1 
Work 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  48.7
Total 18.4  16.9  5.9  3.1  0.8 1.5  3.2  1.0  49.2  100.0
 
Table 18. Level and change in replacement rates before and after the reform. 
  Occupational status 
  Disability Unemployed Long  term 
sick 
Pension 
Before 64.7%  69.7%  82.8% 72.2% 
After 60.4%  64.8%  77.0%  66.5% 
Change -6.6%  -7.0%  -7.0%  -7.8% 
 
 
Table 19. Disposable income per family type and the Gini-coefficient 








Single mother  141  149  8  6 
Single female  152  162  10  7 
Single men  187  201  14  7 
Couple 208  223  15  6 
       
Gini-coefficient  0.258 0.256 -0.002  -0.7 
 
 
Table 20. Disposable income per family type and the Gini-coefficient  








Single mother  210  225  15  7% 
Single female  187  204  17  9% 
Single men  206  222  16  8% 
Couple 213  231  18  8% 
       
Gini-coefficient  0.275 0.269 -0.006  -2% 
 
Table 21. Change in Social Welfare for different weights of inequality aversion 









Change 6.53% 4.93% 4.50% 3.38% 
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Figure 1. Structure of SWEtaxben. 
 
 
Event: Disability pension 
Population at risk: Disability pension, unemployed, long term sick, 
working, 18-64 
Model: Dynamic logit model 
Variables: Lagged value, year, age, education, region, marital 
status, initial value, nationality, gender, replacement  rate 
Event: Unemployment 
Population at risk: Unemployed, long term sick, working, 18-64 
Model: Dynamic logit model 
Variables: Lagged value, year, age, education, region, marital 
status, initial value, nationality, gender, replacement  rate 
Event: Long term sick 
Population at risk: Long term sick, working, 18-64 
Model: Dynamic logit model 
Variables: Lagged value, year, age, education, region, marital 
status, initial value, nationality, gender, replacement  rate 
Event: Working hours and social assistance 
Population at risk: Other, working 
Model: Structural labor supply model estimated separably for: 
1. Single mothers,   2. Single females, 
3. Single males,   4. Cohab 
Variables: Disposable income, leisure, age, education, region, 




h¥0, social assistance  yes/no 
 Working hours, social assistance and occupational status has been 
imputed for all individuals. In a final call to MINI-FASIT disposable 
income and other variables are calculated at optimal hours of work. 
No 
No 
Event: Old age pension 
Population at risk: Old age pension, other, working, 61-70 
Model: Dynamic logit model 
Variables: Year, age, education, region, initial value, nationality, 
gender, replacement  rate, income above the cap  
No 
 Event: Imputation working hours. 
Population at risk: Individuals belonging to one of the states above 
and predicted to exit. 


































































Figure 3. Marginal and average tax rates 2006 and 2009. 




Source: Own calculations. 
Note.   Tax rates calculated at a municipal tax rate of  31.44% for an individual below 66 years of age. 
  The income distribution is based on taxable income for all individuals between age 18-65. 



































Figure 4. Basic tax deduction and in-work tax credit. 
 
     SEK 
 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Note:  At a municipal tax rate of  31.44% for an age below 65. 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution disposable income all individuals. 
 
 

















































Note: Household disposable income adjusted for household size.  
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